Private businesses and entrepreneurs are widely regarded as essential to regional economic growth, and small firms have been viewed as important generators of new jobs since the seminal although not uncontroversial work of Birch (1987; also Acs & Armington, 2006) . Owners of businesses who also reside in the community may have the best interests of the community in mind (Kolko & Neumark, 2010) . Even so, the question of whether the place of residence of a firm's owner matters for economic growth has been not been investigated systematically. This study examines the effect of firm ownership, controlling for firm size, on U.S. county-level economic well being, including counties that are urban and non-urban.
The study uses the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) Database provided by the Edward Lowe Foundation (www.youreconomy.org). This unique dataset describes ownership type and firm size across U.S. counties, but it has not been widely explored previously, and to our knowledge has not been used in the context of economic growth modeling.
1 Results of this study are relevant for academics and policymakers, especially in light of current discussions surrounding stimulus spending.
The Importance of Firm Size and Ownership in Economic Development
Several authors have examined the role of firm size in the economic growth of regions (e.g., Loveridge & Nizalov, 2007) . Empirical evidence generally suggests that the presence of smaller firms is correlated positively with subsequent economic growth (Rosenthal & Strange, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2010) . Small firms may benefit local economies because of higher marginal productivity of workers and greater flexibility to adapt to external shocks. In contrast, larger firms are postulated to enhance economic development through economies of scale, agglomeration effects, volume traded, specialization, and greater capacity for innovation through dedicated research and development (R&D). Some authors also emphasize the destructive effects of large firms on smaller firms and local jobs, which are detrimental in the short run but may represent creative destruction in the long run. Larger firms also may exercise monopsony power over labor leading to reduced economic growth (e.g., Bonanno & Lopez, 2008) .
2
Although locally owned companies are argued to promote local economic development, there is no clear evidence of this relationship. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find no consistent effect of local (non-subsidiary) firms on growth, while Kolko and Neumark (2010) detect a positive effect of local firm ownership on employment stability only for corporate headquarters or commercial chains. Michelacci and Silva (2007) suggest that local entrepreneurs are more successful because they have been able to build up stronger business networks over time. Non-local firms may provide an economic boost given that they provide new employment sources and activity; however, they may also be less flexible or less innovative at the local level and have little local impact because of vertical and horizontal integration with other non-local (subsidiary) firms (Glaeser et al., 2010) . Non-resident-owned large (big-box) stores such as Wal-Mart may stifle local economic growth and innovation, or they may accelerate economic development through Schumpeterian destruction.
As indicated, this note examines the effect of both firm size and locus of ownership on subsequent economic performance. This provides a complementary analysis to previous empirical work, but especially to Rosenthal and Strange (2003) who, using similar data, examine relationships between firm size and ownership and birth of new establishments (and employment).
The dependent variable used in the present study instead measures economic or per capita income growth rates over time across both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.
Empirical Methods
A parsimonious standard equilibrium growth model is given by
where g γ is per capita income growth in percent, α is a constant term, ε a well-behaved random error, and β and δ are parameters to be estimated. Variable γ o is the beginning period (time zero) per capita income that controls for regional convergence as in Higgins et al. (2006) , and firms is the set of variables of interest (also at time zero): firm size and ownership characteristics. We refer to this as the short, basic model. In addition, we estimate a full model that includes four additional variables as controls: population density (with an expected positive effect owing to agglomeration economies); county land area (positive effect as it allows for expansion); percent of population with a bachelor's degree (positive effect); and an industry entropy or diversity measure (with a negative effect since greater diversity implies less specialization). Table 1 reports definitions of and descriptive statistics for these additional variables along with the per capita income variables obtained from standard Census sources such as www.usacounties.gov (except for the entropy measure, which is calculated). Table 2 ). The total sample consists of 2,953 counties.
3 Table 2 here
The county-level NETS database was published on youreconomy.org and is used in the empirical estimations (firms variables). The database is maintained by the Edward Lowe Foundation to describe the dynamics of the U.S. economy by following over 34 million establishments between 1990 and 2007 (Walls & Associates, 2010) . Data include firm ownership type (residential and non-residential) and firm size measured as micro (1 to 9 employees), small (10 to 99 employees), medium (100 to 499 employees), and large firms (over 500 employees). Not surprisingly, the number of firms per capita owned locally (resident firms) is substantially greater compared to those not locally owned (non-resident firms) in all size categories except for the very largest one (over 500 employees), where it is the same at 0.02 per thousand people (or two per 100,000 residents). It is noteworthy that some micro and some small firms are not locallyowned. In all estimations below, the firms variables are normalized using county population.
Regression Results and Discussion
All regressions include state fixed effects and standardized coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors. In Table 3 (Porter, 2000; Testa, 2006; Goetz et al., 2009) .
Table 3 here
More firms per capita clearly benefit income growth in both the short and full models of Set I (all firms combined). However, when we disaggregate firms based on ownership the standardized effect of resident-owned firms is clearly stronger in both the short and full models -in fact, in the short model the coefficient on non-resident firms lacks statistical significance. Thus, even after we control for other economic growth determinants, the standardized contribution of resident-owned firms is more than four times larger than that of non-resident owned firms.
Next we explore the effect of firm size on economic growth regardless of who owns the firm (resident or not); this is shown as Set III results in Table 4 , again for the short and full models. Set III results reveal a strong positive effect of small firms on economic growth, but negative rates of economic growth for medium and large firms. These results hold in both the short and full models, but the positive effect of micro-sized firms disappears in the full model;
that is, when we control for other factors.
Table 4 here
When ownership and firm size are considered (Set IV), the non-resident owned medium and large firms consistently and statistically depress economic growth rates in both the short and full models. The other major result is that resident-owned small firms have a statistically significant and relatively large positive effect in both models. The results for resident-owned micro firms are similar to those of Set III. Table 5 provides full model (Set IV) results differentiating counties according to their urban-rural status. Four columns of results are provided based on the ERS urban-rural continuum code (the higher the code the less urbanized the county). If there is a positive association between firm size and economic growth, through innovation in the major cities for example, then we would expect it to show up here. Table 5 here Table 5 are similar to those in the previous tables. In particular, the residentowned, small firms size consistently stands out as significantly enhancing economic growth, regardless of the relative county size or its position on the rural-urban continuum. The negative effect of large non-local firms is also supported by these results in most although not all categories. Also, the positive significant effect of micro non-local firms on income growth in code 3-6 counties is noteworthy. These could be counties on the urban fringe that offer some natural and agricultural amenities, and yet are not too rural or remote to attract footloose entrepreneurs. A somewhat surprising result is the statistically significant negative effect of density of locally owned micro firms on per capita income growth in core metropolitan areas. This suggests that economic performance of these metropolitan areas is negatively related to the emergence of business from very small local entrepreneurs. This question warrants further investigation.
Results in

Conclusion and Policy Implications
Subject to the caveat that the 2000-2007 period was unique in American economic history, results presented are remarkably robust in terms of the positive link between small firms that are locally owned and per capita income growth. Medium and larger firms appear to have the opposite effect, especially when they are not locally-owned. These include big boxes as well as other chain and non-chain operations that are owned by individuals who are not also residents of the community. While these types of firms may offer opportunities for jobs, as well as job growth over time, they do so at the cost of reduced local economic growth, as measured by income.
Small-sized firms owned by residents are optimal if the policy objective is to maximize income growth rates. Note: All explanatory variables are measured in 2000 (see note to Table 3 ). Additional explanatory variables are not reported. Robust standard errors used in all estimations. Code 1 means USDA-ERS (Economic Research Service) urban -rural continuum code 1 (counties in metropolitan areas of more than 1 million people), and so on until code 9 (completely rural counties with less than 2,500 urban population and not adjacent to metropolitan areas). For more details see: www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/rurality/ruralurbcon. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Notes
1 Important exceptions are Rosenthal and Strange (2003) and Carlton (1983) , who use earlier versions of this dataset.
2 Examples of negative links are reported by some studies of big box retailers' effects on local economies (Goetz & Rupasingha, 2006; Neumark et al., 2008) .
